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LENDING A HAND INSTEAD OF BREAKING THE
BANK: THE IMPERATIVE NEED TO RESOLVE THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT FOR DETERMINING UNDUE
HARDSHIP FOR SECTION 523(A)(8) STUDENT
LOAN DISCHARGES
RUCHA PANDIT*
ABSTRACT
The Bankruptcy Code permits petitioners to discharge their
student debts if they are able to demonstrate that their loans impose an undue hardship. Somewhat frustratingly, the Code does
not define what exactly constitutes undue hardship in the context of
student loan discharges. Moreover, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has broken its silence to offer guidance on the issue. As
a result, the rest of the federal judiciary has been once again, left to
its own devices.
Over the past few decades, the Brunner and totality-of-thecircumstances tests have emerged as the standards that federal
circuits choose between to assess whether student loan repayment
would cause the petitioner undue hardship. Although an overwhelming majority of circuits has endorsed the Brunner formulation,
the test is considered by many to set an impossibly high burden
for petitioners to surmount.
This Note argues that the circuit split for determining undue
hardship is purely illusory. The plain wording of both the Brunner
and totality-of-the-circumstances formulations indicates that there
is no real difference in the substantive inquiry conducted by each
test. Rather, the divergence stems from a history of a retributive
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dicta being wrongly imputed to the Brunner standard. This Note
argues that if the Brunner Standard is properly applied, the notion
of a circuit split will be dispelled. Furthermore, this Note also encourages Congress to assist the judiciary by providing guidance
on how it defines undue hardship.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of the United States bankruptcy system is to afford a fresh start to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”1
Although the Bankruptcy Code precludes “the opportunity for a
completely unencumbered new beginning” for financially overburdened petitioners, it nonetheless remains that a central purpose
of the Code is to provide a mechanism through which “certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their
creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life ... unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”2
Attempting to comport with the “principles of humanity [and]
justice,”3 upon which bankruptcy law is squarely founded, is section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.4 Section 523(a)(8) provides
that although student education loans are presumptively nondischargeable, they are not exclusively nondischargeable.5 Rather, a
student may obtain relief from the loan if she is able to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that repayment of the
debt imposes an “undue hardship on the debtor and [her] dependents.”6 The federal bankruptcy system attempts to strike a balance between the Code’s goal of offering a fresh start to debtors who
are oppressively overburdened by their financial obligations and
Congress’ goal of “preventing abuse of the student loan program.”7
However, simply relying on the plain language of the statutory provision paints a deceptively optimistic picture of petitioners’ realistic access to student loan discharges.8 In an effort to

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 279, 281 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting
Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244).
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2:471–73.
4 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
5 See Daniel A. Austin, Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy: An Empirical Assessment, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 577, 579, 579 n.24 (2015). Although “most types
of consumer debt are [freely] dischargeable in bankruptcy,” education loan debt
is not. Id. at 579.
6 Garner, 498 U.S. at 279 (holding that “[p]reponderance of the evidence is the
standard of proof for § 523(a)’s dischargeability exceptions”); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
7 In re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1994); see In re Kelly, 582 B.R.
905, 909 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2018) (observing that § 523(a)(8) juggles competing
policy objectives of protecting “the debtor’s right to a fresh start” and ensuring
“financial integrity of educational loan programs”).
8 See, e.g., In re Chambers, 348 F.3d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). See generally
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
1
2
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reconcile these emulous policy interests and honor Congress’ assertion that “some public policy considerations override the need to
provide the debtor with a fresh start,”9 the Bankruptcy Code designates certain kinds of debts as presumptively nondischargeable.10
The Code identifies three types of student educational debts that,
absent a showing of “undue hardship,” are presumptively nondischargeable in bankruptcy:11 (1) a debt for “an educational
benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole
or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution”;12 (2)
a debt for “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship, or stipend”;13 or (3) a debt for “any other
educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in
section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred
by a debtor who is an individual.”14
As the analysis of this Note does not turn on the differentiation between the aforementioned types of educational loans, all
three will be collectively referred to as “student loans.”
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have purported
to truly define undue hardship.15 Although the Supreme Court
has perfunctorily recognized the need for student loan discharge
petitioners to demonstrate undue hardship,16 it has not attempted

In re Chambers, 348 F.3d at 653.
10 Id.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 12–14.
12 § 523(a)(8)(A)(i).
13 Id. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).
14 Id. § 523(a)(8)(B).
15 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101 (provision fails to include “undue hardship”
among list of defined terms applicable to Bankruptcy Code); In re Burton, 339
B.R. 856, 869 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (“The term ‘undue hardship’ is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code.”); In re Nys, 446 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Congress provided little in the way of express legislative intent specifically
addressing the ‘undue hardship’ requirement when it passed the statute.”); Scott
Pashman, Note, Discharge of Student Loan Debt Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8):
Reassessing “Undue Hardship” After the Elimination of the Seven-Year Exception,
44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 605, 608 (2001) (“The legislative history does little to
assist a court in identifying when Congress intended student loans to be discharged for ‘undue hardship.’”).
16 See generally United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260
(2010); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
9
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to define the scope of the standard itself.17 As a result, lower federal courts continue to bear the responsibility of identifying the
scope and contours of what constitutes undue hardship for petitioners in the context of section 523(a)(8).18
Rising to the challenge, federal courts have developed numerous tests in an attempt to emulate Congress’ intent of expressly
including a statutory nondischargeability exception,19 and at the
same time, assessing on a per-case basis,20 whether enforcing student loan debt repayment might impose an undue hardship on the
petitioner.21 Indeed, there is so ample scope for interpretation
that there have been developed “as many tests for undue hardship
as there are bankruptcy courts.”22 Several standards have been
devised over the years to facilitate the assessment for undue hardship,23 but contemporary opinions have “narrowed the field”24 to
two tests25 and, as a result, seem to have created one faction on
either side of a deeply entrenched circuit split.26 Particularly, the
dominant standards are the Second Circuit’s Brunner test27 and

See generally United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 559 U.S. 260 (2010).
18 Pashman, supra note 15, at 608.
19 Id. (“[C]ourts have developed a number of tests for determining the existence of ‘undue hardship’ over the last two decades.”).
20 Kerry B. Melear, The Devil’s Undue: Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy, the Undue Hardship Standard, and the Supreme Court’s Decision in
United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 264 ED. L. REP. 1, 11 (2011) (“Because
Congress did not provide a specific definition of undue hardship in the Code,
bankruptcy courts are left to make that determination on a per-case basis.”).
21 See supra text accompanying note 9.
22 Robert F. Salvin, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors
Be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 139, 149 (1996)
(citing In re Johnson, 121 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)).
23 See, e.g., id. at 153–61 (discussing Johnson, Bryant, Brunner, and totalityof-the-circumstances tests).
24 Hon. Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?!—We Don’t Need
No Stinking Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases
and the Income Contingent Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 83 n.57
(2005) (citing Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found., 330 B.R. 323, 325–27 (D. Mass.
2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Durrani, 320 B.R. 357, 359–60 (N.D. Ill. 2005)).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 26–28.
26 See Dorsey v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 528 B.R. 137, 143 (E.D. La 2015) (discussing that “circuits are split” between Brunner test and totality-of-thecircumstances test in context of “determining undue hardship.”).
27 See Brunner v. N. Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
17
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the Eighth Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances test.28 Although
the Brunner test has been adopted by a majority of the circuit courts
to analyze a debtor’s undue hardship,29 it has garnered much criticism for setting a seemingly impossibly high standard for most
student loan bankruptcy petitioners to realistically meet.30
This Note argues that the circuit split caused by the two
standards is illusory and deceptive. Although the Brunner and
totality-of-the-circumstances tests define undue hardship with different verbal formulations, there is no actual difference between
the substantive considerations that the plain language of the two
standards seeks to assess.31 The two analytical frameworks appear deceptively different in application, not because of substantive
differences in statutory interpretation of the undue hardship standard, but rather because courts have incorrectly applied Brunner.32
In particular, courts claiming to adopt the Brunner formulation
have, over the years, erroneously imputed to it, the punitive “certainty of hopelessness” dicta set forth in In re Briscoe.33 They have
done this with such frequency that Brunner has come to be applied
in a retributive manner that is neither in accordance with Congress’ intent in promulgating section 523(a)(8) nor the plain language of the test itself.34
Part I will first provide a brief history of the underpinnings
and evolution of section 523(a)(8).35 Part II will describe the tripartite frameworks of the Brunner and totality-of-the-circumstances
tests.36 Part III will then reject the notion of a circuit split.37 Finally, Part IV discusses the ways through which the perceived
circuit split can potentially be resolved.38

See id.; In re Andrews, 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981).
29 Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court) at 3, 4 n.1.
30 In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
31 See infra Part III.
32 See infra Part III.
33 See infra Part III.
34 See infra Part III.
35 See infra Part I.
36 See infra Part II.
37 See infra Part III.
38 See infra Part IV.
28
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I.ORIGIN AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 523(A)(8)
Student loan debt has not always been nondischargeable
in bankruptcy.39 In fact, student loans, like most types of consumer
debt, were dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings until Congress
promulgated the Education Amendments of 1976.40 These amendments were a direct response to a 1973 Congressional Commission on Bankruptcy Laws (Commission) report revealing that
the Commission had detected abuses in the discharge of student
loans.41 Notably, there is some evidence suggesting that the
“problems with the educational loan program were not the result
of students [abusing the availability of loan discharges but rather because of] the inadequate administration of [the] programs
[themselves].”42 In an effort to curb alleged abuse of the loophole in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that permitted “full dischargeability
for student loans,”43 Congress included in its codification of the
Education Amendments of 1976, section 439A.44 The addition of this
section fundamentally altered the status of student loans and rendered them presumptively nondischargeable.45 Specifically, section 439A provided that absent undue hardship, student debts

See Frank T. Bayuk, Comment, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for
Student Loans Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence
for the Undue Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004).
40 Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439A, 90 Stat.
2081, 2141 (1976) (repealed 1978); see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1973, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at
11, 170, 176–77 (1973).
41 Id.
42 Jennifer L. Frattini, Comment, The Dischargeability of Student Loans: An
Undue Burden?, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537, 545, 545 n.48 (2001).
43 Bayuk, supra note 39, at 1094. Bayuk further notes that:
Curiously, the Commission did not propose [limits on student
loan dischargeability] based on a perceived widespread abuse
of the bankruptcy system by student loan debtors, as it noted a
lack of statistical evidence suggesting any significant problem.
Rather, it justified the proposal on the belief that even a small
number of “abuses discredit the system and cause disrespect
for the law and those charged with its administration.”
Id. at 1094–95 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
44 See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439A, 90 Stat.
2081, 2141 (1976) (repealed 1978).
45 Id.
39
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were nondischargeable unless loan repayment had been due more
than five years prior to the petition.46
Despite considerable congressional debate regarding the necessity of limitations on student debt repayment relief as mandated by the Education Amendments of 1976,47 Congress opted to
retain section 439A’s student nondischargeability provision in the
form of section 523(a)(8) when it promulgated the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the modern Bankruptcy Code that remains in
effect today in modified form.48 As it was originally written, section
523(a)(8), although upholding the presumption of nondischargeability of student loans, also retained the provisions from section
439A that offered petitioners two methods through which they
could rebut this presumption.49 When it was first promulgated,
petitioners could still discharge student loans under 523(a)(8) by
(1) demonstrating an undue hardship,50 or (2) proving that the
loan “first became due” at least five years prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy.51
Since section 523(a)(8)’s enactment in 1978, however,
Congress has further restricted bankruptcy petitioners’ access to
student loan discharges by periodically amending the provision.52
Two of these section 523(a)(8) amendments are of particular

See id.
See id.
48 CONG. RSCH. SERV., BANKRUPTCY AND STUDENT LOANS 6, 6 n.38 (2019)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY].
49 See infra notes 50–51.
50 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8), 92 Stat. 2591 (1978).
51 Id.
52 See Bayuk, supra note 39, at 1096 (“It thus appears, in light of these changes,
that Congress has increasingly narrowed the means by which a debtor may discharge his or her student loans.”). Examples of amendments to section 523(a)(8)
include the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the Crime Control Act of 1990,
the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005. See Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 454(a), 98 Stat.
375–76 (1984); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 3007, 104 Stat. 1388-28 (1990); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 3621(1)–(2), 104 Stat. 4964–65 (1990); Higher Education Amendments of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 1837 (1998); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119
Stat. 59 (2005).
46
47
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significance:53 (1) the Crime Control Act of 1990,54 and (2) the
Higher Education Amendments of 1998.55
The 1990 amendment narrowed the scope of student loan
dischargeability under section 523(a)(8) in two ways.56 Firstly, it
extended the “first became due” provision’s range from five to seven
years57 and, in doing so, increased the “temporal window for nondischargeability.”58 Additionally, the amendment also “broadened the type of educational loan debts excepted from discharge,
[and set] forth the language found in the current version of section 523(a)(8).”59
Subsequently, in its promulgation of the 1998 Higher Education Amendments, Congress eliminated the “first became due
provision” of 523(a)(8) entirely,60 thereby leaving demonstration
of undue hardship as the sole manner of recourse for student
loan petitioners under section 523(a)(8).61
In its current form, section 523(a)(8) states:
A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
....
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and
the debtor’s dependents, for:
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made
under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual.62


See infra notes 54–55.
54 See Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 3621(1)–(2), 104 Stat. at 4964–65 (1990).
55 See Pub. L. No. 105-244 § 971(a), 112 Stat. at 1837 (1998).
56 See infra notes 57–58.
57 See Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 3621(1)–(2), 104 Stat. at 4964–65 (1990).
58 See Bayuk, supra note 39, at 1096, 1096 n.33.
59 Id.
60 See infra notes 61–62.
61 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244,
§ 971(a), 112 Stat. 1837 (1998).
62 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
53
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II.ESTABLISHING A STANDARD FOR UNDUE HARDSHIP
A. The Brunner Test
Almost every federal court of appeals, barring the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has adopted the
tripartite Brunner standard to analyze the question of what constitutes undue hardship for the purposes of student loan discharges under section 523(a)(8).63 The Seventh Circuit adopted the
Brunner test in 1993 and was the first federal court of appeals to do
so.64 Over the next several decades, the Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits followed suit.65
Under Brunner, a petitioner claiming undue hardship
must demonstrate:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income
and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and
her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely
to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. 66

A debtor must prove each element by a preponderance of
the evidence in order to be discharged of her student loans.67 The
Brunner court discussed that satisfying the first prong of the tripartite test is the “minimum necessary to establish ‘undue hardship.’”68 The court further noted that a showing of undue hardship

See Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management
Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court) 1, 4 n.1 (citing In re Faish, 72 F.3d
298, 305–06 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005);
In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 385
(6th Cir. 2005); In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Cox, 338
F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003)).
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id.
66 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
67 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 279 (1991).
68 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (citing Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); N.D. State Bd. of Higher
Educ. v. Frech, 62 B.R. 235 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Marion v. Pa. Higher
Educ. Assistance Agency, 61 B.R. 815 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986)).
63
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under the subsequent two prongs of the test is necessary “in light of
the clear congressional intent ... to make the discharge of student loans more difficult than that of other nonexcepted debt.”69
Under Brunner, the debtor must first overcome the minimal standard of living test in which a petitioner must demonstrate
more than just tight finances or that repayment of debt necessitates “personal and financial sacrifices.”70 The first prong indicates that a petitioner does not demonstrate undue hardship for the
purposes of student loan discharge simply for failing to maintain
her preexisting standard of living or facing discomfort.71 However,
courts have consistently held that under the plain language of
the Brunner test, a petitioner need not live in poverty in order to
demonstrate undue hardship under the first prong.72
In determining whether a petitioner has satisfied the first
prong of the Brunner test, courts typically compare the petitioner’s
disposable income, given the debtor’s budget and allocation of expenses, with the monthly payment necessary to pay off the student loan.73
If a court is convinced that loan repayment would force the
debtor into a subminimal standard of living, it must next consider
whether or not such a quality of life will persist such that the burden imposed on the petitioner might be truly undue.74 Requiring
a demonstration that the debtor’s inability to pay and subminimal
standard of living is likely to persist comports with Congress’ intent
that student debt discharges ought to be less freely awarded relative to other nonexcepted debt in bankruptcy proceedings.75

Id.
In re Elmore, 230 B.R. 22, 26 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (citing Pa. Higher
Educ. Agency v. Faish, 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3rd Cir. 1995)).
71 See, e.g., In re Halatek, 592 B.R. 86, 97 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2018) (quoting
In re Gesualdi, 505 B.R. 330, 339 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013)).
72 See Elmore, 230 B.R. 22, 26 (citing Correll v. Union Nat’l Bank of Pittsburgh,
105 B.R. 302, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989)).
73 See In re McLaney, 375 B.R. 666, 674 (M.D. Ala. 2007); see also BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, at 12 n.87 (citing In re Miller, 409 B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2009) (explaining that the court must evaluate “the debtor’s household
income and those expenses necessary to meet his or her basic needs”). “On the
income side, courts consider all sources of income and revenue streams.” In re
Tuttle, 600 B.R. 783, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2019).
74 See, e.g., Tuttle, 600 B.R. at 795.
75 Id.
69
70
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Lastly, the third prong of the Brunner test recognizes that
the decision to discharge a student loan is premised on the assumption that the debtor has made good faith efforts to pay off
the debt.76 The third element of the tripartite test, undue hardship, “encompasses a notion that the debtor may not willfully or
negligently cause his own default, but rather his condition must
result from ‘factors beyond his reasonable control.’”77 Notably, a
student loan petitioner’s obligation to make a good faith effort at
full repayment persists even in the case that her loan is discharged,
in the form of attempts to “obtain employment, maximize income
and minimize expenses.”78
While the Brunner standard has enjoyed a great deal of popularity79 and is the majority approach taken by federal appellate
courts grappling with the decision of whether to discharge a student
loan,80 the fact-intensive nature of its inquiry has also led to “subsidiary splits in the courts with respect to a host of issues” in terms
of applying the tripartite test.81 Examples of inter-court rifts in
inquiry include:
[(1)] the types of expenses a debtor seeking an undue hardship
discharge may permissibly incur;
[(2)] the legal standard the debtor must satisfy to prove that
his inability to repay the student loans will likely persist into
the future;
[(3)] whether a debtor who claims that a medical condition prevents him from repaying his student loans must introduce
corroborating medical evidence to support his claim;
[(4)] whether a debtor seeking an undue hardship discharge
must attempt to maximize his income by seeking employment
opportunities outside his field of training;
[(5)] whether it is proper to consider the value of the education
that the loan financed when determining a debtor’s eligibility
for an undue hardship discharge; and


Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
77 In re Elmore, 230 B.R. 22, 27 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (quoting In re Roberson,
999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993)).
78 Id.
79 See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges
and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 496 (2012).
80 See id. (“Although judges devised numerous tests, in recent years, the
Brunner standard has come to dominate the field.”).
81 See BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, at 11.
76
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[(6)] whether the “additional circumstances” mentioned in
Brunner’s second prong must predate the issuance of the loan.82

The Brunner test furthers two policy goals.83 Firstly, the
standard comports with Congress’ intent to limit the Bankruptcy
Code’s notion of a fresh start.84 The test reflects the broader societal opinion that education debts should be exempt from discharge
because of the benefits associated with student loans.85 For example, making education more affordable and, therefore, accessible
by permitting it to be financed by loans might outweigh the benefits of later absolving students of their obligation to repay the
debt.86 Additionally, the notion that debtors knowingly accept the
burden of repaying their education debts supports the proposition
that petitioners are not entitled to a student loan discharge simply
because they entered into an unfortunate or unlucky bargain.87
Secondly, the Brunner test also curtails fraud and abuse
by ill-intentioned debtors.88 By setting such a high bar to student
loan discharges, the standard practically eliminates frivolous proceedings instituted by petitioners seeking to take advantage of
the bankruptcy system by cunningly absolving themselves of debt,
encourages debtors to truly attempt repayment, and promotes judicial efficiency by reducing the resources and costs associated
with litigating student loan discharges.89
Notably, neither the plain language of the Brunner formulation,90 Congress’ intent in promulgating section 523(a)(8),91 nor
general societal interests in cautiously limiting the availability of

Id.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 84–89.
84 Ben Wallen, One Standard to Rule Them All: An Argument for Consistency
in Education Debt Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX
L.J. 232, 233 (2016).
85 Id. at 240 (citing Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship
in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 413–14 (2005)).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 240–41.
89 Id.
90 See supra text accompanying note 64.
91 See supra Introduction.
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student loan discharges92 seems to be motivated by a desire to
punish honest but unfortunate debtors who are unable to repay
their student loans.
B. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
Out of all the federal courts of appeals, only the Eighth
Circuit applies the totality-of-the-circumstances test.93 Under this
standard, a court will consider: “(1) the debtor’s past, present, and
reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) the debtor’s reasonable and necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant
circumstances.”94 Unlike the perceived rigidity of the Brunner
test, the totality-of-the-circumstances standard attempts to take
a holistic consideration of the petitioner’s condition by not allowing
“a single factor [to] bar [the debtor] from discharge.”95
Particularly, the third “catchall” prong of the Eighth Circuit’s formulation acknowledges the equity powers of the adjudicating court and imputes deference to its ability to determine the
existence of petitioners’ undue hardship on a case-by-case basis
after having considered all facts relevant to the inquiry.96 By encouraging a holistic determination of the debtor’s present financial condition rather than requiring a debtor to satisfy all three
elements of the standard in order to successfully demonstrate
undue hardship, the totality-of-the-circumstances test seemingly
advances the “fresh start” principle of the Bankruptcy Code more
efficiently than the Brunner formulation.97

See supra text accompanying note 85.
93 See, e.g., In re Long, 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Andrews,
661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981).
94 Long, 322 F.3d at 554.
95 See Wallen, supra note 84, at 243.
96 Id. at 242–43; see B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(A)(8)
of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 89, 106–07 (2002).
97 See, e.g., Educ. Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he totality of circumstances test better considers the debtor’s situation in light of the ‘fresh start’ policies of § 523(a)(8), because it does not let a
single factor become dispositive against a finding of undue hardship.”) (citing
In re Afflitto, 273 B.R. 162, 170 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001); In re Law, 159 B.R.
287, 292–93 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993)).
92
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C. Other Formulations
Interestingly, circuit courts did formulate and apply other
tests to determine undue hardship prior to ultimately adopting
either the Brunner or totality-of-the-circumstances framework.98
For example, in Johnson v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, the Bankruptcy Court formulated the Johnson Tripartite test in which the court assessed undue hardship based on
a three-part test comprised of (1) a mechanical test of income and
expenditures, (2) a good faith test, and (3) a policy test.99 Similarly,
in Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency,
the court expressed its dissatisfaction with the Johnson test and
instead chose to assess student loan discharge petitioners’ undue
hardship using the Federal Poverty Guidelines as a benchmark.100
As these standards have long been overshadowed and rendered obsolete by the Brunner and totality-of-the-circumstances
formulations,101 this Note addresses only the circuit split created
by these two enduring and contemporary standards.102
III.REJECTING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The differences between the plain language of the Brunner
and totality-of-the-circumstances tests are purely cosmetic and
thereby render the perceived circuit split illusory.103 As a practical matter, the two formulations at the root of the circuit split
are identical in their substantive considerations and will likely

See Salvin, supra note 22, at 153–59, 161–62 (describing Johnson Tripartite and Bryant Poverty Level tests that were used to determine undue
hardship prior to being overshadowed by Brunner and totality-of-the-circumstances formulations).
99 See id. at 153 (citing Johnson v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 5
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)).
100 See id. at 161–62 (citing Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,
72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
101 See Julie Swedback & Kelly Prettner, Discharge or No Discharge? An
Overview of Eighth Circuit Jurisprudence in Student Loan Discharge Cases,
36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1679, 1684 (2010) (“Over the years, courts have developed several legal tests to give practical effect to the legal standard intended by
Congress, but only two of these tests effectively remain: the Brunner test and
the totality-of-the-circumstances test.”).
102 Id.
103 Educ. Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004).
98
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always lead to similar conclusions regarding whether a petitioner
faces undue hardship.104 Rather, any divergences in the scope and
severity of judicial inquiry between the two standards are the result
of courts incorrectly imputing a punitive overlay on the Brunner
standard and thereby applying the test in a manner inconsistent
with its plain language.105
A. Courts Have Rejected the Notion of a Circuit Split
Several courts that have purported to adopt the Brunner
test have also rejected the notion that there is a stark diversion in
the substantive considerations of the tests,106 and noted that “the
distinctions between the two tests [, if any,] are modest, with many
overlapping considerations.”107 Remarkably, even the Eighth Circuit has, to an extent, acknowledged that the substantive differences between its totality-of-the-circumstances test and the Brunner
test “may not be that significant,” practically speaking.108
1. The First Circuit
Perhaps most notably, the First Circuit has refused to pick
a side in the circuit split.109 While a split panel of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the First Circuit has supported the Eighth
Circuit’s standard,110 the First Circuit has not formally adopted
either the Brunner or the totality-of-the-circumstances test.111

See Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management
Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court) at 10.
105 See Rosenberg v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 610 B.R. 454, 458–
59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting how the certainty of hopelessness standard,
coined by the In re Briscoe court, has been conflated with the Brunner test so
consistently, that “many cases have pinned on Brunner punitive standards
that are not contained therein”).
106 See infra note 103.
107 Educ. Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004) (“As
a practical matter, ... the two tests will often consider similar information [such
as] the debtor’s current and prospective financial situation in relation to the
educational debt and the debtor’s efforts at repayment.”); see, e.g., Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 n.1 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Oyler,
397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005).
108 Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 779 n.1.
109 Bronsdon, 435 B.R. at 797.
110 Id. at 797 n.9, 798, 800.
111 Id. at 797.
104
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Instead, the court has, on a number of occasions, been cautious to endorse either standard precisely because the differing
verbal formulations of both tests ultimately result in an identical
substantive inquiry of facts and considerations in the determination
of whether a petitioner’s student loans impose a dischargeable
undue hardship.112 Essentially, the choice between the Brunner and
totality-of-the-circumstances formulations make so little substantive
difference, that the First Circuit has simply refused to choose between the two.113
2. The Tenth Circuit
While the Tenth Circuit has formally endorsed the Brunner
standard,114 it has similarly refused to entertain the idea that the
Brunner and totality-of-the-circumstances truly tests diverge in
terms of the scope, severity, and substance of judicial inquiry.115
Particularly, in Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Polleys,
the court rejected the notion that the Brunner test confines the
scope of judicial inquiry strictly to the three prongs delineated
by the standard.116 Instead, the Polleys court, while adopting the
Brunner formulation, endorsed and engaged in conducting a holistic, totality-of-the-circumstances type analysis of all the factors
relevant to the petitioner’s demand for relief.117
3. The Sixth Circuit
Similarly, in Oyler v. Education Credit Management Corp.,
upon recognizing the lack of substantive difference between inquiries under the totality-of-the-circumstances and Brunner tests,

See Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management
Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court), 5 n.2 (citing Judgment, Bronsdon v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 10-9009 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 2011)); see also In re
Nash, 446 F.3d 188, 190–91 (1st Cir. 2006).
113 Nash, 446 F.3d at 190–91.
114 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004).
115 Id. (“We do not read Brunner to rule out consideration of all the facts
and circumstances .... [Brunner, like the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,]
necessarily entails an analysis of all relevant factors, including the health of the
debtor and any of his dependents and the debtor’s education and skill level.”).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1308–12.
112
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the Sixth Circuit transitioned from using a holistic, “hybridBrunner”118 model, to adopting Brunner’s tripartite test as its
exclusive analytical framework for determining undue hardship
in student loan bankruptcy proceedings.119
Up until Oyler, the court’s application of a hybrid-Brunner
formulation served to promote a more flexible judicial inquiry beyond just the Brunner prongs and provide the adjudicator with a
more holistic understanding of the specific petitioner’s circumstances.120 Among the factors considered by the court in the hybridBrunner test were (1) the petitioner’s debt amount; (2) the interest
rate; (3) the petitioner’s claimed expenses in relation to her current standard of living; (4) the petitioner’s income, earning potential, education, age, wealth, and status of dependents; and (5) the
petitioner’s attempt to maximize income by obtaining or seeking
employment “commensurate with her education and abilities.”121
The Oyler court, although having abandoned the hybridBrunner model in favor of exclusively adopting the Brunner formulation,122 did not dispense with the hybrid test’s holistic analysis
that was notably reminiscent of the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach.123 Rather, the court simply recognized the lack of substantive difference between its hybrid-Brunner formulation and the
Brunner test itself.124 It acknowledged that its previous holistic,
multifactorial inquiry “actually fit easily into the well-accepted
Brunner analytical template”125 and accommodated all the factors it considered determining undue hardship under the hybridBrunner test.126
B. Explaining the Source of Divergence
Rather than a difference in substantive inquiry between the
Brunner and totality-of-the-circumstances tests, the discordance
and harsh application of the Brunner formulation is the direct

In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (citing Miller v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 377 F.3d 616,
623 (6th 2004)).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 386.
124 In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 385–86.
118
119
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result of the “certainty of hopelessness” threshold being incorrectly
imputed and conflated with Brunner’s analytical framework.127
As a result, courts often misinterpret the straightforward language
of the Brunner model by applying a punitively harsh standard that
is neither supported by the plain language of the Brunner test nor
congressional intent in promulgating section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code.128
1. Origins of the Certainty of Hopelessness Standard: Briscoe
The certainty of hopelessness threshold was first formulated
in Briscoe by a court that, in fact, preceded the Brunner court.129
In the absence of much guidance in the way of determining undue
hardship for the basis of discharging a student loan, the Briscoe
court concluded that, based on the legislative history of section
523(a)(8) and Congress’ increasing aversion to absolving education
debts, a valid basis of undue hardship should only be recognized
if forcing repayment would result in “certainty of hopelessness”
for the student.130 Under the court’s new standard, a mere present
inability to repay the loan or unfortunate financial adversity was
insufficient to qualify for undue hardship under the “certainty of
hopelessness.”131 The practical result of the Briscoe court’s opinion
was that it set a degree of hardship for student loan discharge petitioners that was prohibitively high and nearly impossible to meet.132
2. History of Courts Incorrectly Imputing the “Certainty of
Hopelessness” Standard to the Brunner Test
The Brisco court’s punitive certainty of hopelessness standard has been so often implicated in the context of Brunner that

See In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
See infra Sections III.B.1–2.
129 In re Briscoe, 16 B.R. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
130 Id. at 130–31.
131 Id. at 131 (“For the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523, the dischargeability of
student loans should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply
a present inability to fulfill financial commitment.”).
132 See, e.g., In re Kohn, 1979 Bankr. LEXIS 884, at *32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1979) (“[M]ere financial adversity without more will not do. There must be present
such unique circumstances to render it less likely, or likely only with extreme
difficulty, or unlikely at all, that the bankrupt will within the foreseeable future
be able to honor his commitment.”).
127
128
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it has essentially “subsumed the actual language of the Brunner
test.”133 As a result, although the plain language of the Brunner
formulation does itself not presume to impose impossibly high standards of demonstrating undue hardship for the purposes of punishing unfortunate debtors,134 courts incorrectly imputing Briscoe’s
dicta to Brunner create such an effect.135
For example, in In re Roberson, the court held that the petitioner did not qualify for a student loan discharge under the
Brunner test.136 Even though the debtor’s financial condition at the
time of the proceedings prevented him from maintaining a minimal standard of living, he had failed to establish a certainty of
hopelessness demonstrative of the fact that his dire financial position would persist.137 The Roberson court erroneously imputed
Briscoe’s dicta onto the Brunner test’s second prong which requires
the petitioner to demonstrate that he would persistently face substandard living conditions if forced to repay the debt.138 The plain
language of Brunner’s second prong does not indicate that a petitioner must demonstrate a certainty of hopelessness in order to
convince a court that her subminimal standards of living are likely
to persist for a significant portion of the time.139 Yet, the Roberson
court’s conflation of the certainty of hopelessness standard with
the Brunner test resulted in an application of Brunner where a
petitioner could not possibly demonstrate undue hardship but
for a showing that she is certain to face persistent and impossibly burdensome dire financial straits if forced to comply with
loan repayment.140

In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020); see, e.g., In
re Jean-Baptiste, 584 B.R. 574, 588 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Johnson, 550
B.R. 874, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2016); In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2007); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993).
134 See supra text accompanying note 66.
135 See Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 458 (“The harsh results that often are associated with Brunner are actually the result of cases interpreting Brunner.”).
136 999 F.2d at 1138.
137 Id. at 1137.
138 Id.
139 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
140 Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136 (“[T]he dischargeability of student loans
should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a present inability to fulfill financial commitment.”) (quoting Briscoe, 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
133
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In Johnson v. Sallie Mae Inc., the court similarly imputed
Briscoe’s certainty of hopelessness dicta to the second prong of
the Brunner test.141 It held that the debtor failed to demonstrate
undue hardship under the second element because she did not
present any evidence showing “‘a certainty of hopelessness’ that
she would be able to repay her loans.”142 By making such a conclusion, the Johnson court erroneously established that a student
loan petitioner, in order to successfully prove undue hardship
under Brunner, must necessarily demonstrate a certainty of
hopelessness.143 This court, like the Roberson court, incorrectly
integrated the Briscoe dicta into the Brunner test such that the
petitioner had to demonstrate a severity of her financial hardship that is simply not called for under a plain reading of the
Brunner formulation’s language.144
Education Credit Management Corp. v. Mosely led to the
same conflation of the Briscoe dicta with Brunner’s second prong.145
The Mosely court incorrectly concluded that under Brunner:
[U]ndue hardship does not exist simply because the debtor presently is unable to repay ... her student loans; the inability to pay
must be “likely to continue for a significant time,” such that
there is a “certainty of hopelessness” that the debtor will be able
to repay the loans within the repayment period.146

Most recently, in Jean-Baptiste v. Education Credit Management Corp., the court once again reaffirmed the erroneous projection of the certainty of hopelessness threshold to Brunner’s model.147
As in Roberson, Johnson, and Mosely, the result in Jean-Baptiste
was that although the court purported to apply the Brunner test,148
it held the petitioner to an extremely high standard of showing
hardship that simply is not called for under a plain reading of

In re Johnson, 550 B.R. 874, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2016).
Id. (citing Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosely, 434 F.3d 1320, 1326
(11th Cir. 2007)).
143 Id.
144 Id. See also Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (per curiam).
145 In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Hemar Insur.
Corp. of America v. Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003); Brightful v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 267 F.3d 324, 328 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
146 Id.
147 In re Jean-Baptiste, 584 B.R. 574, 588 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018).
148 Id. at 586–88.
141
142
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Brunner’s analytical and doctrinal framework.149 While Brunner’s
second prong requires a debtor to demonstrate that her subminimal standard of living is likely to persist for a significant portion
of the loan repayment period,150 the wording does not purport to
require a petitioner to show that the severity of her standard of
living and her financial condition prove an absolute certainty of
hopelessness.151
The consequence of courts incorrectly applying the Briscoe
dicta to Brunner’s doctrinal framework is grave. The certainty of
hopelessness threshold, without much justification at all, imposes
an impossibly high standard for petitioners to surpass.152 It does so
even when demonstration of such severe hardship is not warranted,
neither by the language of the Brunner test153 nor by Congress’
intent in promulgating section 523(a)(8).154
In fact, courts applying the Brunner formulation while simultaneously incorporating Briscoe in effect subvert the underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Code itself because they inadvertently
punish honest but unfortunate debtors who would truly face undue
hardship if forced to repay their educational debts.155 The fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Code and, in particular, section
523(a)(8) is to provide well-intentioned but unlucky students relief
in the event that repayment of their student debt would be financially oppressive and effectuate a subminimal standard of living.156

Id. at 588 (holding that in order to satisfy Brunner’s second prong, “a
debtor must demonstrate that the additional circumstances point to a ‘certainty of
hopelessness’ and not merely a present inability to pay student loan debt.” (citing
Mosely, 434 F.3d at 1326; Johnson v. Sallie Mae Inc., 550 B.R. 874, 880 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 2016))).
150 Id. (“In order to satisfy the second Brunner factor, a debtor must establish that her current inability to pay her student loan debt is likely to persist
for a significant portion of the repayment period.”).
151 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
152 See In re Rosenberg, 610 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting that
Briscoe’s retributive dicta was erroneously imputed to Brunner so frequently
that it has become “a quasi-standard of mythic proportions so much so that most
people (bankruptcy professionals as well as lay individuals) believe it impossible to discharge student loans.”).
153 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (per curiam).
154 See supra Introduction.
155 See Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 459; see also infra text accompanying notes
156–59.
156 See Salvin, supra note 22, at 143–44, 174.
149
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Section 523(a)(8) is designed to offer relief to students who experience dire financial straits, even if they are not impoverished.157
What is most clear, however, is that section 523(a)(8) is not meant
to punish students who qualify for its protections.158 If students
are able to demonstrate undue hardship under the plain meaning
of the Brunner or totality-of-the-circumstances tests, then they
should be permitted to avail themselves of the protections statutorily afforded to them by the Code.159
IV.PROPOSING A SOLUTION
A. The Brunner and Totality-of-the-Circumstances Tests Would
Lead to Similar Conclusions if Courts Did Not Erroneously
Impute Briscoe’s Dicta to Brunner’s Analytical Framework
Given that the verbal formulations of the Brunner and totality-of-the-circumstances tests both lead to the same or very
similar substantive inquiry,160 petitioners’ cases should theoretically be decided the same way regardless of which standard is
applied.161 Indeed, this hypothesis has proven to be true for courts
that have conducted judicial inquiry into the debtor’s case-specific
circumstances by even-handedly applying the Brunner test according to its plain meaning.162

See, e.g., In re Correll, 105 B.R. 302, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“We do
not believe, however, that Congress intended a fresh start under the Bankruptcy
Code to mean that families must live at poverty level in order to repay educational loans .... [u]se ... of poverty level or minimal standard of living guidelines is not necessary ....”).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See supra Part III.
161 See supra Part III.
162 See Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L.
REV. 1115, 1141 (2016) (“The data reveal that debtors experienced litigation
success 38.8% of the time in Brunner jurisdictions and 40.6% of the time in
totality jurisdictions .... the difference ... is not statistically significant.”); see also
Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court) at 17 (“There is simply no reason at all to
suppose that a totality-of-circumstances ‘test’ [as opposed to the Brunner test
applied without Briscoe’s ‘certainty of hopelessness’ dicta] would find [petitioner’s] evidence of undue hardship any more persuasive.”).
157
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Rather, the only instance where a court’s finding of undue
hardship might depend on the test it has used, is the situation in
which the court incorrectly imputes Briscoe’s certainty of hopelessness dicta onto the Brunner test.163 In such a situation, Brunner,
in practice, imposes an impossibly high threshold for petitioners
to surmount, despite the test’s plain language suggesting that it
should not be too harsh a standard for the honest but unfortunate debtor to meet.164
B. Circuit Courts and Congress Should Both Standardize Undue
Hardship
Considering that no substantive difference exists between
Brunner and the totality-of-the-circumstances formulations,165 both
the federal courts as well as Congress should use their authority
to dispel notions of a circuit split. Simply put, the perceived circuit
split is merely illusory.166 It is high time that there be a standardized approach for determining undue hardship for section
523(a)(8) student loan discharge proceedings.
1. The Judicial Solution
The federal circuit courts should uniformly strip Briscoe’s
certainty of hopelessness dicta from Brunner and even-handedly
apply the Brunner formulation according to its plain language.
This proposed approach is based in both practical and doctrinal
justifications.167

See, e.g., In re Armstrong, Bankr. No. 10-82092, Adv. No. 10-8118, 2011
WL 6779326, at *8–*9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2011) (“Under the totality of
circumstances test, it could be concluded that these circumstances constitute a
hardship that is undue. However, the ... Brunner test [that is erroneously made
more restrictive by Briscoe’s dicta] does not clearly admit such an exception.”).
164 See supra Part III.
165 See supra Part III.
166 See Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court) at 10 (“Despite the different
verbal formulations, there is no substantive split between the circuits on how
to analyze undue hardship cases.”).
167 See infra Sections III.B.1–2.
163
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a. Practical Advantages of Courts Uniformly Adopting the
Brunner Standard
Firstly, this solution accounts for the fact that practically
speaking, it makes more sense to resolve the illusory circuit split
by adopting the Brunner test as opposed to the totality-of-thecircumstances test.168 While the verbiage of both tests is substantively identical and thus renders the importance of which standard
is used as technically unimportant,169 the reality is that the vast
majority of circuit courts do adhere to the Brunner standard.170 It
would not make much realistic sense to advocate for the adoption
of a minority test when the majority framework, when correctly
applied according to its plain meaning, functions as a substantive equivalent.171 Thus, the most practical and efficient method
of ensuring judicial predictability in determining the undue hardship posed by student loans on a petitioner would be to promote
uniformity and encourage the straightforward application of the
overwhelmingly favored Brunner standard—just without Briscoe’s
retributive overlay.172
b. Doctrinal Advantages of Courts Uniformly Adopting the
Brunner Standard
From the perspective of doctrinal uniformity, resolving the
illusory circuit split by ensuring the Brunner standard’s application
without Briscoe’s retributive dicta also lays the groundwork for a
clearer cut and more predictable framework for determining a

See infra text accompanying notes 169–72.
169 See supra Section III.A.
170 See, e.g., Brief in Opposition for Respondent Educational Credit Management Corporation (No. 15-485 Supreme Court) at 4 n.1 (citing In re Faish,
72 F.3d 298, 305–06 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th
Cir. 2005); In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Oyler, 397
F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998);
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); In
re Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)).
171 See supra Section III.A.
172 See, e.g., In re Grigas, 252 B.R. 866, 874 n.8 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (noting
that the Brunner standard is more predictable than totality-of-the-circumstances
test because of Brunner’s popularity among federal circuit courts).
168
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debtor’s undue hardship than does the totality-of-the-circumstances test.173
Considering that the variance in results between applications
of the two tests is both substantively and statistically insignificant,174 it is unclear that the totality-of-the-circumstances framework’s widely perceived flexibility and holistic approach actually
provides a substantial benefit to litigants whose undue hardship
is assessed along its framework.175 Since petitioners’ chances of
success are statistically equal under the Brunner and totality-ofthe-circumstances formulations,176 it makes sense to then argue
that federal circuits should simply adopt the test that is doctrinally the easiest to apply.177
Out of the two formulations, Brunner’s more rigid analytical
framework provides greater predictability and encourages far more
consistent application of the doctrine.178 The totality-of-the-circumstances formulation, in its pursuit of encouraging a holistic analysis
of the petitioner’s circumstances,179 is far more open ended and
does not specify factors for consideration as acutely as the Brunner
test.180 While the totality-of-the-circumstances test is relatively
more flexible because it permits courts to consider factors beyond
the scope of the test’s formulation itself,181 it is precisely this

See infra notes 174–85.
See Pardo, supra note 162, at 1141.
175 See BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, at 30 (“The central difference between
the totality-of-the-circumstances test and the Brunner test concerns their relative
flexibility. Whereas the totality-of-the-circumstances test is a more open-ended
standard that permits the court to consider a wide variety of factors, the Brunner
test is somewhat less malleable .... Courts and commentators disagree, however,
regarding the extent to which the Brunner test actually varies from the totalityof-the-circumstances test as a practical matter.”).
176 See Pardo, supra note 162, at 1141.
177 See G. Michael Bedinger VI, Note, Time for a Fresh Look at the “Undue
Hardship” Bankruptcy Standard for Student Debtors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1817,
1830 (2014).
178 See BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, at 30 (“[S]upporters of the Brunner
test have opined that the totality-of-the-circumstances test is insufficiently
predictable and affords judges too much discretion in determining whether
any particular debtor qualifies for an undue hardship discharge.”).
179 See Wallen, supra note 84, at 243.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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flexibility that makes the formulation more unpredictable and susceptible to inconsistent application.182 On the other hand, the
Brunner standard explicitly sets forth the three—and only three—
factors that a court must consider when determining whether a
petitioner’s student loans impose an undue hardship.183 Its selfcontained framework and explicit factors provide greater predictability and, therefore, will also likely lead the judiciary to uniformly
apply the test’s tripartite considerations in a manner that will
promote consistency in results among the circuit courts.184
All in all, it makes sense that judicial efficiency, uniformity,
and predictability are all likely to be enhanced with the application of the plain meaning of the Brunner standard because it
clearly sets forth all factors to be considered in the assessment of
undue hardship.185
2. The Congressional Solution
Congress should also amend section 523(a)(8) in a manner
that guides uniformity throughout the judiciary and advances the
fundamental principles of the Bankruptcy Code in the context of
student loan discharges.186 The most efficient way for Congress
to do this is to codify a definition of undue hardship.187 Particularly, it should explicitly state that a debtor need not demonstrate
a certainty of hopelessness in order to qualify for a student loan

See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir.
2004) (“[A] totality of the circumstances analysis of each debtor’s situation ....
has an unfortunate tendency to generate lists of factors that should be considered—lists that grow ever longer as the case law develops.”).
183 See supra text accompanying note 66.
184 See Bedinger, supra note 177, at 1830 (“Brunner provides ‘concrete factors’
that increase predictability ....”) (citing Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp.,
252 B.R. 866, 874 n.8 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000)).
185 See supra text accompanying notes 173–84.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 1–6; see also Salvin, supra note 22,
at 143–44.
187 See, e.g., Salvin, supra note 22, at 170 (“It is thus imperative that the
underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code be accurately identified and defined in order to give meaning to the undue hardship standard.”); Aaron N. Taylor,
Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging Federal Student
Loans in Bankruptcy, 38 J. LEGIS. 185, 187 (2012) (“Undue hardship is an undefined concept, flummoxing debtors, creditors, and judges alike. The result
of its ambiguous contours is rampant inconsistency.”).
182
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discharge under the statute.188 In defining undue hardship, Congress could also set forth the tripartite considerations of the Brunner test.189 Doing so would provide affirmative and streamlined
guidance for courts attempting to analyze whether a student loan
discharge is warranted.190 Preferably, Congress should do both.
a. Congress Should Explicitly State that a Certainty of
Hopelessness Is Not Required for a Petitioner to
Demonstrate Undue Hardship
In codifying a definition of undue hardship, Congress should
swiftly dispel the notion that student loan discharges under section 523(a)(8) are conditional on a debtor’s demonstration of a
certainty of hopelessness.
The primary justification for clarifying that satisfying
Briscoe’s retributive dicta is not needed for relief under the statute191 is that the certainty of hopelessness standard is flagrantly
antithetical to the inherent purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.192
The Bankruptcy Code serves to afford debtors a fresh start and
free them from oppressive debt.193 Indeed, the legislative history
of the Code itself demonstrates that student loan discharges should
be available to any debtor who is “legitimately unable to afford
repayment.”194 Yet the certainty of hopelessness standard unconscionably punishes petitioners who are hardly able afford bare
necessities simply because they cannot satisfy an arbitrary and
unduly harsh judicial threshold that fundamentally subverts the
Code’s fresh start policy in the first place.195
The certainty of hopelessness standard deprives petitioners,
who would otherwise qualify for relief, not only of their statutory
right to obtain relief, but also of the hope that they can reestablish themselves as unburdened and productive members of

See, e.g., C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of Higher Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 107 (2007) (“Congress needs to
establish a universally accepted test of ‘undue hardship’”).
189 See infra Section IV.B.2.b.
190 See infra Section IV.B.2.b.
191 See supra Section III.B.
192 See, e.g., Salvin, supra note 22, at 143.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 180, 180 n.259.
195 Id. at 178–80.
188
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society.196 In short, Congress explicitly excluding a petitioner’s
certainty of hopelessness from the definition of undue hardship
would reaffirm the fundamental principle that the Bankruptcy
Code’s purpose is to empower, not punish, honest but unfortunate
debtors.197 Such a resounding statement in return, would make
courts who retributively scrutinize student loan petitioners under the certainty of hopelessness standard think twice.198
In addition to the aforementioned policy justification,
Congress should statutorily overrule Briscoe’s certainty of hopelessness dicta under section 523(a)(8)’s definition of undue hardship because undue hardship has been indirectly defined without a
retributive gloss elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.199 Section
524(m) of the Code sheds some light on how Congress might intend
to generally define undue hardship.200 This section asserts that an
agreement “is an undue hardship on the debtor if the debtor’s
monthly income less the debtor’s monthly expenses ... is less than
the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed debt.”201 Notably absent from this implicit definition is any assertion that a petitioner
must be facing dire or hopeless conditions in order to successfully
demonstrate undue hardship under the section.202 Admittedly,
section 524(m)(1)’s definition cannot be a perfect definition of undue
hardship under section 523(a)(8) because the subject matter of
the sections is different.203 While section 523(a)(8) concerns discharging student loans,204 section 524(m)(1) guides the process
of reviving discharged debt.205 Nevertheless, section 524(m)(1) at
least hints at the fact that Congress leans towards a broader
definition of undue hardship and does not intend to retributively
restrict petitioners’ satisfaction of the requirement.206

Id. at 180–81.
197 Id. at 143–44.
198 See supra Section III.B.1.
199 See Bedinger, supra note 177, at 1838–39.
200 Id.
201 11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1) (2012).
202 See Bedinger, supra note 177, at 1838–39.
203 See infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
204 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
205 See Bedinger, supra note 177, at 1838; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1).
206 See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text.
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b. Congress Should Include Brunner’s Tripartite
Framework When It Codifies a Definition of
Undue Hardship
Congress should set forth the three factors considered under the Brunner framework207 when it defines undue hardship for
the purposes of a section 523(a)(8) discharge.208 The legislature endorsing an analytical framework that is as clear and self-contained
as Brunner209 will help resolve the circuit split by offering courts
a relatively straightforward process through which undue hardship can be reliably assessed without burdening petitioners with
prohibitively high standards of proof.210 In short, inclusion of the
Brunner factors would further contour a uniform definition of
undue hardship and reduce inconsistencies in statutory interpretation.211 It would also ensure the predictability of the judiciary’s
determination of undue hardship, at least in terms of ensuring
that courts are not incorrectly applying the Briscoe dicta in their
application of the Brunner test.212
CONCLUSION
It is high time for federal circuits to apply a standardized
and predictable framework in its analysis of whether a student loan
petitioner is entitled to debt discharge under section 528(a)(8).
Consistent and reliable interpretation of the statute’s requirement
of undue hardship is necessary to comport with the Bankruptcy
Code’s fresh start policy.213
The Code seeks to afford relief to those petitioners who are
truly unable to free themselves from the shackles of insurmountable
debt.214 It serves as a vehicle for empowerment. Incorrectly

207 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
208 See infra text accompanying notes 209–12.
209 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
210 See BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, at 39–41.
211 See, e.g., id. at 41 n.293.
212 See id. at 39–41.
213 See Salvin, supra note 22, at 174 (“The goal of the fresh start policy is
to give the honest-but-unfortunate debtor a new opportunity in life free from
the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debts.”).
214 See id. at 180, 180 n.259.
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imputing Briscoe’s retributive certainty of hopelessness dicta onto
the Brunner fundamentally subverts the essence of the Bankruptcy Code.215 It impermissibly punishes the very honest but
unfortunate debtors whom the statute seeks to protect.216 More
so, it perpetuates the illusion of a circuit split when in reality,
the two leading analytical frameworks of undue hardship are
substantively identical.217
Judicial standardization of the undue hardship analysis
through the adoption of a Brunner framework without Briscoe’s
overlay will resolve this illusory circuit split and ensure the evenhanded determination of undue hardship among the federal circuits.218 Congress can also help dispel the notion of a circuit split
by codifying a definition of undue hardship.219 Specifically, it can
explicitly state that, for the purposes of section 523(a)(8), undue
hardship does not include a showing of a certainty of hopelessness.220 It can also include Brunner’s tripartite factors in its definition to streamline the considerations that courts should take
into account when conducting their undue hardship analysis.221
As of 2021 student loan debt in the United States is about
$1.7 trillion.222 Courts need to understand the urgency with which
they must determine undue hardship in a manner that comports
with the essence of the Code.223 Doing so will resolve the illusory
circuit split that has been perpetuated by principles which are
directly antithetical to the notion of awarding debtors a fresh
start.224 Now more than ever, students truly burdened by insurmountable loans should be shielded by the very Bankruptcy
Code that was designed to protect them.225
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